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3.1  Introduction 
From the mid-eighteenth  century until the First World War,  the scale of 
political units around the world grew ever larger. At least part of the motivation 
for large political size during these years was economic. The past few years 
have seen an increasingly rapid unraveling of this process. Looking at the Euro- 
pean Community (EC), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
and even the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), it’s hard not to think 
of  strong, regional customs unions as the wave of  everyone’s future. Yet  the 
experience of  the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia really does 
suggest otherwise. The GATT-governed multilateral trading system has made 
possible the extraordinary economic success of microstates like Hong Kong 
and Singapore. And it is this success that has surely emboldened Estonians, 
Slovaks, and Tadjiks to assume that separation from large political units need 
not mean economic disaster. The great continental superpowers that came into 
existence before 1914 and that ran roughshod over cultural diversity may well 
have been made anachronistic not so much by increasing ethnic identification 
as by the open, multilateral global trading system of the late twentieth century. 
The multilateral trading system has been capable of providing a substitute for 
much of  the special economic advantages of large political size. The door is 
now potentially open for a plethora of economically viable microstates orga- 
nized, following East Asia, on the basis of cultural affinity. 
The aspirations of  regional economic arrangements do collide with  the 
multilateral system. Slovaks may  seek political independence, confident that 
the GATT will guarantee markets for their products even as it protects their 
access to vital imports. When Slovaks, however, attempt to negotiate the terms 
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of their access to the European Community, they may be in for a nasty surprise. 
Of course, it is the new vitality of regional arrangements such as the European 
Community and NAFTA, and not the obsolescence of dinosaurs like the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia, that provides the context for this paper. 
In the first section of this paper, the consequences of trading bloc formation 
for countries left outside such blocs will be reviewed. In  particular, the case 
where the formation of such a bloc will leave outsiders worse off will be high- 
lighted. This can happen even without the trading bloc violating Article 24 of 
the GATT. Still worse, such blocs can make insiders better off than in the case 
of global free trade. In this circumstance, insiders may have no incentive to let 
in additional members, except where the formation of a rival bloc is threatened. 
The formation of a regional trading bloc may not be a way station on the road 
to global free trade. 
The case outlined in the first section of this paper reflects the concerns of 
the East Asian economies. Trading blocs are being formed elsewhere in the 
world. Even without violating existing GATT provisions, such blocs can lower 
East Asian welfare. These trading blocs may have no incentive to expand their 
membership to include East Asian economies except insofar as they fear pro- 
voking the formation of an East Asian trading bloc. 
The second section of this paper reviews the prospects for a regional trade 
regime in East Asia. Intra-East  Asian trade is currently not large by historical 
standards. Nor does the rapid growth in intra-East  Asian trade reflect much 
more than the very rapid overall economic growth in this region relative to the 
rest of the world. Estimation of a bilateral model of intraindustry trade using a 
factor-endowment-based version of the gravity model suggests no East Asian 
bias in the trading patterns of the leading economies there. There is no evi- 
dence as yet that a rival trading bloc is being formed in East Asia in response 
to developments in Europe and North America. 
In the final section of this paper, the exchange rate-induced  pricing strate- 
gies of East Asian firms across East Asian markets are examined. The results 
suggest that  country-specific  pricing  strategies  seem characteristic  of  East 
Asian markets. Commodity arbitrage may be more difficult in East Asia than 
elsewhere. Despite considerable progress in trade liberalization by many of the 
East Asian economies over the past two decades, there is some indication that 
regionwide liberalization could still be of considerable benefit. 
3.2  The International Economic System and New Trading Blocs 
Since 1945 international trade theory has developed to the extent that it is 
now well understood that the formation of a regional trading bloc may be detri- 
mental to the international economic  system (Machlup 1977). It is possible 
that the benefits for members of a trading bloc through trade creation may be 
less than the costs imposed  on nonmembers  through  trade  diversion  (Viner 
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of nonmembers are responsible for many of the benefits that follow the organi- 
zation of a trading bloc. This can happen even if a trading bloc leaves its pro- 
tective barriers against nonmembers unchanged. Of  course, matters can get 
worse. A newly formed bloc may succumb to temptation and attempt to exploit 
its newfound market power by raising its barriers against nonmembers and 
still further improving its terms of trade. Even without assuming such GATT- 
inconsistent behavior, provided not all countries belong to trading blocs, trad- 
ing blocs may  be able, not just to improve member welfare, but to push it 
beyond what might be expected with global free trade. 
By way of  illustration consider a world with N countries of equal size (see 
Krugman 1991).  Each country is specialized in the production of a single good 
that is an imperfect substitute for the products of  all other countries. These 
countries are not only equal in size; they also have identical preferences and 
produce their goods with the same technology. Each country imposes identical 
tariffs on the imports of all other countries, except trading bloc member coun- 
tries impose no tariffs on the products of  fellow members. While Krugman 
puts each of his symmetric countries in one of a number of equal-sized trading 
blocs and assumes that each country produces the same number of units of its 
single good, here it will be assumed that the global economy is divided up 
between members and nonmembers of  a single bloc and that each country’s 
production of its single good is variable. 
Analysis of  such a simple system cannot explain why a particular group of 
countries join together in any particular trading bloc. It can illuminate, how- 
ever, what happens to member welfare, nonmember welfare, and global wel- 
fare when a single trading bloc is first organized and then grows in size. Analy- 
sis of  a global economy made up of  countries of  equal size with virtually 
identical characteristics may seem remote from the substance of trade policy, 
but as will be seen, it does appear to capture the concerns of many of the East 
Asian economies. 
Let 
where Xki  =  value of  exports from country k to country i;  xk,  =  volume of ex- 
ports from country k to country i;  and Pk =  price of country k‘s production. 
The demand for country k‘s product by country i is given by 
where N =  number of  countries;  =  country is  income; and tki  =  tariff im- 
posed by  country i on country k’s product. 
Equation (2) states that country i’s income will be spent equally on each 
country’s products except to the extent that the prices of  a country’s product 
diverge from the average price level of all commodities. As noted above, the 
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consequence, p has no subscript. Where countries belong to the same trading 
bloc, tki = 0; where countries do not, tki  = t. Except between bloc and nonbloc 
members, the N countries do not discriminate among their trading partners. 
The demand for country k's product by country i is met by country k's supply. 
The supply of country k's production is given by 
(3) 
where nk0  =  production of country k. Equation (3) is a standard supply func- 
tion. Country k's production of  its single product is a positive function of  its 
price and a negative function of  its costs. Since country k produces a single 
good, all intermediate inputs must be imported from abroad. 
If  the impact of  the formation and growth of  trading blocs on individual 
country welfare and global welfare is to be assessed, it is helpful to discuss the 
determinants of gross global product T~,,  and yk,  country k's real income. From 
equation (3) and summing over k, the expression for gross global product is 
(4) 
Multiplying country k's production from equation (3) by  real prices, real 
income for country k is given by 
g 
Equations (4) and (5) are expressions for gross global product and real in- 
come for country k in terms of  prices. The analysis here requires that gross 
global product and real income for country k be evaluated as a function of bloc 
size and levels of  protection. To do this, the system defined by  equations (1), 
(2), and (3) must be solved for the determinants of  these prices, and the re- 
sulting expression substituted back into equations (4) and (5). 
Assuming that markets clear, the system defined by  equations (I), (2),  and 
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Because countries in this system have the same size with identical preferences 
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to the extent that they are in  or out of  the trading bloc. In consequence, the 
only prices in this system will be the price of goods produced by trading bloc 
members and the price of  goods produced by  nonmembers. From equations 
(6),  (7),  and (8) the ratio of these prices can be obtained by 
where Pb = price of  good produced by trading bloc; Po = price of good pro- 
duced  outside of  trading bloc; n = number of  trading bloc members;  and 
m =  number of outsiders; and where 
This price information can be substituted into gross global product equation 
(4) such that 
1 
1 
n2 + mn(1 + t)(l -  cp  +  ~ 
1-9 
+ m(m -  1)(1  + t) + m .  I 
The price information from equation (9) can also be substituted into equa- 
tion (5) to yield expressions for the national income of  both bloc members 
and nonmembers: 
and 
(N + rnt -  mcp) -  mcpt  l(N -  mcp),  1 
(13)  yo = {@(I - 
(Y  n 
N 
cp) -  -(1  + t)(l - 
With equations (1  l), (12), and (13) it’s possible to examine what happens to 
gross global product and its distribution between bloc members and nonmem- 
bers as the bloc grows in size. In figure 3.1 the gross global product equation 
(1  1) is evaluated for different bloc sizes and for different levels of protection. 
Gross global product roo  is measured along the y-axis, while bloc size varies 
from one to thirty and tariff levels move from 0 to 150 percent. Clearly, in this 
simple world the creation and growth of  a trading bloc is not detrimental to 
global welfare. As can be seen from figure 3.1, at any given level of  t as n 
increases from 1 to 30, no,  increases in value. That is to say, at any given level 94  Gary R. Saxonhouse 
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of  protection the larger the bloc, the greater the gross global product. In this 
world, with every expansion of the size of the trading bloc, trade creation dom- 
inates trade diversion.' Of  course, a bloc that includes all countries is global 
free trade, the equivalent oft = 0, which is the best situation of all. 
At the same time that for any given level of  protection an increase in the 
size of a trading bloc will increase gross global product, for any given size of 
trading bloc an increase in protection will diminish it. As can be seen from 
figure 3.1, for any given n, an increase in t will diminish roo.  In this world a 
trading bloc that complies with Article 24 of the GATT cannot damage global 
welfare. A trading bloc that as it increases in size, however, takes full advan- 
tage of its increased market power to increase its barriers can do considerable 
damage. From figure 3.1 the trade-offs between the benefits to gross global 
product of a bigger trading bloc and the risks to it from increased protection 
are apparent. 
The gain in gross global product that comes from a larger trading bloc when 
protection against outsiders is held constant will not be shared equally between 
members and nonmembers. As seen from equations (lo)-( 13),  the distribution 
1. Because all the countries in this model are alike except for the complete differentiation of 
their products, and because output is not fixed, the expansion of the size of a trading bloc does not 
lead to a decline in global welfare. In Viner (1950), trade diversion can outpace trade creation 
because links between natural trading partners can be severed by the creation of a customs union. 
Here there are no natural trading partners because all countries are alike or otherwise they are 
symmetrically different. As figure 3.1 indicates, gross global product accelerates in proportion to 
the number of tariff walls eliminated. The results here differ not only from Viner but also from 
Krugman (1991). In Krugman, even with countries that are virtually identical except for complete 
product differentiation, the relationship between bloc size and global welfare is not monotonic. 
Krugman's results depend critically on having each country's output fixed and having all countries 
being members of  some equal-sized bloc. In this paper, by  contrast, country output is variable, 
and there is only one bloc. If  a country does not belong to  this bloc, all its exports must bear a 
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of gains between members and nonmembers will depend critically on the rela- 
tive values of a  and p. For example, when a,  the  supply parameter,  is just 
equal to p, the demand parameter, the entire gain in global product will go to 
bloc members and the real income of nonmembers will stay constant unless 
they join the bloc. 
With full employment of resources, however, it is likely that p will be con- 
siderably larger than a.  This is the situation that’s analyzed in figures 3.2 and 
3.3, the counterparts to figure 3.1. In figures 3.2 and 3.3 the nonmember na- 
tional income equation (1  3) and the bloc member national income equation 
(12) are evaluated  for different trading bloc sizes and for different levels of 
protection. National income is in each case measured along the y-axis, while 
bloc size once again varies from 1 to 30 and tariff levels move from 0 to 150 
percent. 
As seen from figure 3.2, in the case where the demand parameter substan- 
tially exceeds the supply parameter,  countries remaining outside the trading 
bloc don’t just lose out relatively. National income actually declines for any 
given level of protection as the trading bloc increases in size. As is apparent 
from equations (9) and (lo),  this result reflects the continuous decline of non- 
bloc member producer prices relative to member producer prices. As the trad- 
ing bloc increases in size, more and more of  what nonmembers want to buy 
becomes increasingly more expensive in terms of what they produce. Under 
such conditions, the nonmember incentives to join the trading bloc are over- 
whelming. This incentive becomes ever stronger even though the bloc, by leav- 
ing the level oft  constant, does not violate Article 24. From figure 3.1 it is also 
clear that if bloc members  and nonmembers can mutually agree to lower t, 
nonmembers can be easily compensated for the loss in national income they 
suffer as the trading bloc grows. 
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Fig, 3.2  Non-bloc  member national income and trading bloc size 
Note: t = tariff rate. 96  Gary R. Saxonhouse 
0.04  T 
0.035 
5  0.03 
.P 
z 




-  t-0 
~  +  t=30% 
~  t-60%  --  t-90%  1 
t  120%  1 
t-150% 
Fig. 3.3  Bloc member national income and trading bloc size 
Note: t = tariff rate. 
While the national income of each nonmember declines monotonically, as 
seen from figure 3.3, trading bloc member national income increases as the 
trading bloc grows in size from its very first members. A larger trading bloc 
means  members  can  buy  more  products  without  trade  restrictions,  and  it 
means, as noted earlier, increasingly favorable terms of  trade with nonmem- 
bers. As long as admitting new members to the trading bloc increases the na- 
tional income of each bloc member, the bloc has no incentive to be exclusive. 
As is apparent in figure 3.3, after the trading bloc has approximately twenty 
out of  a possible thirty members (Europe and North America?), the incentive 
to admit additional members (East Asia?) and move on to free trading evapo- 
rates. At this point, the benefits to trading bloc members from being able to 
buy additional products without trade restrictions becomes less than the losses 
suffered from having  fewer countries  outside the trading bloc trading with 
members on unfavorable terms. With further expansion of the trading bloc, the 
national income of each trading bloc member declines monotonically as each 
new member joins, up to and including the point when no one is left outside 
and global free trade is achieved. Members of a trading bloc can achieve real 
income above what they would receive under free trade if they agree to keep 
their bloc exclusive. They certainly have no incentive to admit new members 
on a symmetric bask2  This important result will hold only so long as outsiders 
don’t organize themselves into a competitive trading blocs3 
2. See Kemp and Wan  (1976, 95-97).  Since global free trade maximizes global welfare, there 
will always be some system of side payments that will allow nonmembers to bribe members into 
allowing them entry to the trading bloc. The terms of such side payments leaving symmetric econ- 
omies in vastly different circumstances may make this an unappealing alternative. 
3. The structure of the game that might result in this event is analyzed empirically in Stoeckel, 
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Once again, nothing in the preceding analysis assumes that the trading bloc 
will attempt to exploit the growing market power that comes with increasing 
size and  raise  its  barriers  against  nonmembers.  Trading  bloc members  can 
achieve real income levels better than global free trade, and nonmembers can 
face continuous declines in real income as the trading bloc expands its mem- 
bership, even while the trading bloc behaves consistently with GATT Article 
24 and makes no attempt to exploit its increasing market power. 
3.3  The East Asian Trade Regime 
The case just outlined captures many of the concerns of the economies on 
the Pacific Rim of  Asia. Very  comprehensive regional trading arrangements 
have been organized or have been greatly strengthened in North America and 
in Europe. The possibility  that, even without raising new barriers at all, the 
growing role of such blocs in the global economy could lower East Asian wel- 
fare is very real. The proliferation of voluntary export restraints, orderly mar- 
keting agreements,  local content rules, new dumping regulations, and other 
aggressive  unilateral measures against some of  these economies suggests it 
may even be naive to assume that such trading blocs are the necessary  way 
stations to a newly  invigorated  global trading system. The optimum size of 
such blocs, from the existing members’ point of view, makes it nai’ve to assume 
that as a matter of course they will be nonexclusive. It may not make sense to 
continuously expand the size of such trading blocs. In particular, it’s not hard 
to imagine some or all East Asian economies being excluded from European 
or Western Hemispheric regional trading arrangements. 
Exclusive arrangements will be preferred to global free trade by members 
of regional trading blocs only so long as there remain a nontrivial number of 
nonmembers  who  retain  protective  barriers  against  each  other  as well  as 
against the trading bloc itself. If nonmembers organize their own rival trading 
bloc, free trade may once again become a superior outcome for all concerned. 
It is with this perspective that the prospect of new trading arrangements in East 
Asia should be examined. While no formal trading bloc has as yet arisen in 
East Asia, do emerging trading patterns there suggest that this is happening 
implicitly?  In  particular,  do intraregional trading  patterns  suggest a Japan- 
centered rival to the European Community and NAFTA is being created? Is 
the scenario suggested by the trade theory in section 3.2 coming to pass? 
At present, intraregional trade is approximately 40 percent of all East Asian 
trade. This is modest by comparison with Western Europe, where intraregional 
trade is over 70 percent of total trade, but it’s considerably larger than the role 
played by intraregional trade in North America. Not only is intraregional trade 
more important in East Asia than in North America, its relative importance has 
been growing rapidly. Twenty years ago intraregional trade was no more than 
30 percent  of East Asian  trade.  By marked  contrast,  intraregional trade  in 
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ingly, if North America, East Asia, Australia, and New Zealand are combined 
into a single region, the share of intraregional trade in the total trade of  the 
Pacific grouping approaches Western European levels. And over the past two 
decades, as over the past decade, intra-Pacific trade has been growing more 
rapidly than intra-Western  European trade. 
These intraregional trade trends provide  some perspective on East Asia’s 
position in a possibly regionalizing global economy. Regional trade is becom- 
ing more important for East Asia. This need not reflect increasing isolation at 
all. Trade with East Asia is not only increasingly important for the East Asian 
economies themselves. It’s also increasingly important for North America and 
for Europe. The increasing bias toward East Asia itself  in East Asian  trade 
might reflect a nascent trading bloc, or since East Asian trade is also increas- 
ingly more important for North America and for Europe, it may reflect no more 
than the increasing economic weight of East Asia in the global economy. 
Since there is no reason to expect one country’s trade to be proportionally 
distributed to all other countries, the issue of whether there is regional bias in 
East Asia trade really needs to be addressed systematically by  estimating a 
model of bilateral trade. The model that will be used to make such estimates 
can explain both cross-country and cross-commodity net and gross trade by 
making allowances for economies of  scale and monopolistic competition, as 
well as for the more familiar differences in natural resources, capital, skills, 
and other national endowments4 
3.3.1  Factor-Endowment-Based Gravity Equations 
Assume that all manufactured goods are differentiated by country of  origin. 
Given the  same homothetic preferences usually  assumed in empirical work 
making use of Heckscher-Ohlin-style trade models, each economy will con- 
sume identical proportions of each good (Learner 1984).  This means that coun- 
try k’s export of good j to country i will be given by 
where dk,  =  export of variety k of good j to country i,  ~~r’k,  =  production of good 
j in country k, mko = C, .rri0 = GNP of country k, TT,,<, = C, T,~  =  global GNP,, 
and Sr =  .rroo/.rr 3 share of country i in global GNP.s 
4. The model presented here is an  extension to bilateral trade of earlier work presented in Saxon- 
5. The properties of  T, the  GNP function, are  described in  more detail  in  Saxonhouse and 
house (1989). See also Saxonhouse (1992). 
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where Ls,  =  endowment of  factor of  production  s in  economy  i,  and  W,, 
rental for factor of production s in economy  i. 
Following the approach taken  in Heckscher-Ohlin  comparative advantage 
analyses, if factor price equalization is assumed, then by Hotelling’s lemma, if 
nko  is differentiated: 
s= 1 
where RJJ  is a function of parameters of T,,  and output prices, which are as- 
sumed to be constant. 
Substituting equations (15) and (16) into equation (14), we get 
where B,,, are functions of T;, and n,,  and where output prices will be constant 
under the assumptions already made. Equation (17) is a factor-endowment- 
based  version  of  the  gravity  equation,  which has been  used for years  as a 
framework for estimating bilateral trade relationships (Anderson 1979). Plau- 
sibly, it explains bilateral trade flows by the interaction between exporter and 
importer factor endowments. Alternatively, if equation (14) is divided by n,, 
before equations (15) and (16) are substituted into it, we get export shares as 
a simple linear function of exporter factor endowments: 
The structure embodied  in equations (17) and (18) results from relaxing 
many of the strictest assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin  model in order to 
incorporate hitherto neglected phenomena in a bilateral trade model. Still fur- 
ther relaxation  is possible.  Suppose that the assumption of strict factor price 
equalization  across countries is dropped.  Suppose, rather,  that international 
trade equalizes factor prices only when factor units are normalized for differ- 
ences in quality. For example, observed international differences in the com- 
pensation of ostensibly unskilled labor may be accounted for by differences in 




xii =  BJrraskariLskLri,  i = 1, . . . ,  N, 
s=lr=l 
6. The GNP function, ?r, has been defined to allow for differentiated products and economies 
of scale. This can be done by  including optimal firm scale in 71,  following the approach taken by 
Helpman and Kmgman (1985). Provided optimal firm scale is small relative to market size, change 
in industry output can be achieved by  changes in the number of firms in the industry. Firms are 
assumed to be identical. This means that at the industry level there will be constant returns to scale. 
7. This was first pointed out by  Leontief (1956) as a possible explanation for the empirical 
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where a, =  quality of factors in country k 
3.3.2  Estimation Procedures 
Equations (17’) and (18‘) can be estimated for N commodity groups and K 
countries using cross-country data. For example, the terms a,, are not directly 
observable but can be estimated from equation (18’). Formally, the estimation 
of equation (1 8‘) with the a,, differing across countries and unknown is a mul- 
tivariate,  multiplicative  errors-in-variables  problem.  Instrumental  variable 
methods  will  allow  consistent  estimation  of  the  B,*,,. For  any  given  cross- 
country sectoral equation, the uy,  will not be identified. In particular, for the 
specification adopted in equation  (1  8’), at any given time there are N  cross- 
sections that contain the identical independent  variables.  This circumstance 
can be exploited to permit consistent estimation of the a,,.*  Since the same 
error will recur in equation after equation owing to the unobservable quality 
terms, it is possible to use this recurring error to obtain consistent estimates of 
the quality terms.  These estimates of the a,, can then be used to adjust the 
factor-endowment data in equations (17’) and (1  8’) to obtain more efficient 
estimates of B,vr  and B,*cr.9 
3.3.3  Estimation of the Trade Model 
Equations (17’) and (18’) are estimated with data taken from the forty-two 
countries listed in table 3.1.’”  Equations (17’) and (18‘) are estimated for each 
of the twenty-nine manufacturing sectors listed in table 3.2 for 1985. The six 
factor endowments used in this estimation include directly productive capital, 
labor, educational attainment, petroleum reserves,  arable land, and transport 
resources.”  The Heckscher-Ohlin  equations  (17‘) and (18’) are assumed to 
hold up to an additive stochastic term. 
8. The approach taken here is analogous to the two-step “jackknife” procedure first proposed 
in Guilkey and Schmidt (1973). As an  example of  the approach taken here, let usk  = 1 + u:~, 
assuming E(a:,) = 0. Using instrumental variable techniques in the presence of multiplicative er- 
rors allows consistent estimates of the B;s,. Using these estimates, for each economy an N(J -  1)Xl 
vector [v,]  of the net trade residuals can be formed. Consistent estimates of the quality terms can 
be obtained from 
(B;,,L) ’  (B,:,Lsk)  ~  YB;,JJ  ’(v,) 
9. Following Durbin (1954), and in common with two-stage least squares, the approach taken 
here uses synthetic instrumental variables. Factor endowments are ordered according to size, and 
rank is used as an instrument. 
10. Since the factor-endowment variables in equation (1 8) explain national development, there 
is no need to limit the sample used here to just the most advanced economies. In general, less- 
advanced economies impose more protection than the most-advanced economies. This develop- 
ment-related protection is explained by changes in the levels of the factor endowments. Typically, 
the higher the level of factor endowments, the less the protection. 
11. Following the suggestion of  Dixit and Norman (1980), transport costs are incorporated in 
the Heckscher-Ohlin framework by  treating them as another factor of production. Transport costs 101  Pricing Strategies and Trading Blocs in East Asia 











































Table 3.2  Trade Sectors in Sample 































Other food manufacturing 
Beverage industries 
Tobacco manufactures 
Manufactures of  textiles 
Manufactures of wearing apparel except footwear 
Manufactures of leather products except footwear and apparel 
Manufactures of  footwear except rubber or plastic 
Manufactures of wood and cork products except furniture 
Manufactures of furniture and fixtures except primarily metal 
Manufactures of paper and paper products 
Printing, publishing, and allied industries 
Manufactures of industrial chemicals 
Manufactures of other chemical products 
Petroleum refineries 
Miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal 
Rubber products 
Plastic products not classified elsewhere 
Pottery, china, and earthenware 
Glass and glass products 
Other nonmetallic mineral products 
Iron and steel basic industries 
Nonferrous metal basic industries 
Fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment 
Manufactures of machinery except electrical 
Electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances, and supplies 
Transport equipment 
Professional and scientific measuring and control equipment 
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Table 3.3  The Estimation of xi, = xT=  I xf-  I B,,ras,a,,Ls,L,I 
ISIC#  R’  F(35,957)  ISIC#  RL  F(35,957) 
311  .334  13.7**  354  544  32.6** 
312  ,019  0.498  355  ,283  10.8** 
313  ,336  13.8**  356  ,013  0.383 
3 14  ,323  13.0**  36 1  .220  7.7** 
32 1  ,195  6.6**  362  ,302  11.8** 
322  .515  28.5**  3 69  ,283  10.8** 
323  S38  3 1.8**  37 I  ,491  26.3** 
324  .5 15  29.0**  372  ,544  32.6** 
33 1  ,197  5.87**  38  I  ,389  17.4** 
332  .266  9.89**  382  .33  1  13.5** 
34 1  ,592  39.6**  383  .I74  5.75** 
342  ,454  22.7**  384  ,063  1.83** 
35  1  ,505  27.8**  385  .254  9.29** 
352  ,011  0.331  390  ,017  0.472 
353  ,605  41.8** 
**  significant  ‘  at the .05  level, F(35,957) = 1.43. 
Unlike the Heckscher-Ohlin net trade equations, the dependent variable in 
these bilateral equations will never be negative, but they will occasionally be 
zero. As most of the twenty-nine equations to be estimated will contain some 
zero  observations,  equations  (17’)  and  (18’)  can be  specified  as a  Tobit 
model.I2 
Some of the results of estimating equation (1  7’) using the ark  obtained from 
estimating  equation (18) and excluding the East Asian economies from the 
sample are presented in tables 3.3 and 3.4. As can be seen in table 3.3, twenty- 
six out of the twenty-nine bilateral trade equations are statistically significant. 
These results mean it is possible to get a good explanation of the structure of 
bilateral trade when full advantage of the many available degrees of freedom 
is taken by including a large number of cross-country factor-endowment inter- 
action terms. Table 3.4 identifies the statistically significant role played by the 
interaction between exporter and importer factor endowments  in explaining 
bilateral trade flows. The signs of these coefficients will reflect the degree of 
complementarity or substitutability between the various factors of production 
and their relative importance in the various sectoral production processes. 
are treated as proportional to the weighted average of  country distance from potential trading 
partners. Countries are weighted in this calculation by  their GNPs or GDPs. This particular ap- 
proach allows the incorporation of transport costs within the bilateral Heckscher-Ohlin framework 
without abandoning the possibility of factor price equalization up to some multiplicative constant. 
12. The Tobit estimation  methods used here  for equations  (17‘) and (18’) are described in 
Greene (1981, 1983) and Chung and Goldberger (1984). 103  Pricing Strategies and Trading Blocs in East Asia 
Table 3.4  Number and Sign of Significant (.05) Coefficients on Factor- 
Endowment Interaction Terms (B,s,) 
LAND 
CAPITAL,  LABOREAp EDUCF1,,  OILEIp  TRANS,,  AM, 
~~~___~ 
+  -+-+-  +-+-+- 
CAPITAL,,,  5  17  8  610  514  6  9  414  7 
LABOR,,,  14  4  51610 810  4  6  713  8 
EDCJC,,,,  15  61211 71211  5  8  3  9  6 
04"p  7  7  7  3  9  7  414  5  6  711 
TRANS,,,,  5  3  6  81014 6  810  8  5  6 
LAND AM,,  11  517  312  3  512  7  8  812 
~  ~ 
Note  The rows in this table index the factor endowments of importers  The columns index the 
factor endowments of  exports  The cells in this table indicate how many significant coefficients of 
each sign are found for the associated interaction terms in the twenty-nine estimated equations 
3.3.4  Is There Regional Bias in East Asian Trade? 
The results presented in tables 3.3 and 3.4 have been obtained by estimating 
equation (18') without using East Asian observations. Using these estimated 
structures and introducing observations on East Asian factor endowments, tol- 
erance intervals have been constructed for East Asian regional trade and for 
the major flows in East Asia's extraregional trade. The constructed tolerance 
intervals indicate with a probability of  .99 that .99 of the normal distribution 
of a trade flow will be found within the interval. Observed trade flows are then 
compared with these tolerance intervals. Observations that fall outside these 
tolerance intervals are considered evidence of regional bias (Christ 1966). 
The findings for East Asian intraregional exports compared with East Asian 
exports to much of North America and the European Community are striking. 
East Asian  intraregional exports appear to be well-explained by the factor- 
endowment-based  gravity equations.  As seen in table 3.5, out of a total of 
2,088 trade flows only 325 are outside the tolerance interval. This relatively 
small number of extreme observations suggests there may be little regional 
bias in East Asian trade. Neither policy initiatives by the Association of South- 
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) nor very large intraregional East Asian invest- 
ment  has  resulted  in  intraregional  distortions  in East Asian  trade  patterns. 
What  is true for the region as a whole is also true at the individual coun- 
try level. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia have no more than a small number of ex- 
treme observations on their intraregional bilateral trade flows. 
By comparison with intraregional trade, East Asia's  extraregional trade is 
marked by many observations that fall outside the constructed tolerance inter- 
vals. Whereas there are an average of thirty-nine extreme observations per in- Table 3.5  Extreme Observations on East Asian Intraregianal  Exports 
Hong 
Japan  Korea  Taiwan  Kong  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  Indonesia 
+-+-  +-+-+-+  -+-+-+- 










00121  1  10032  5313001 
23002100413  3022231 
12040040342  2231  142 
30335300421  0312313 
210221  12003  3321431 
22412035310  0304.502 
05101424433  2002351 
31263135212  4540040 
32204034073  0625300 
Note; Rows in this table index imports. Columns index exports. Each cell indicates the number of extreme observations, + indicates overexporting and -  underex- 
porting. Maximum number of  extreme observations for any bilateral pair is twenty-nine. Critical value for tolerance interval T(  .99, .99, 957) = 2.5 I. 105  Pricing Strategies and Trading Blocs in East Asia 
traregional market, as seen from table 3.6 for East Asian extraregional export 
markets there are more than twice as many extreme observations per market. 
The factor-endowment-based gravity equations estimated without East Asian 
data do a much better job of explaining the trade among East Asian economies 
and overall East Asian trade, than of explaining the pattern of East Asian trade 
with non-East  Asian trading partners. 
The extraregional biases in East Asian trade are striking. Particularly inter- 
esting are the patterns of East Asian exports to the European Community by 
comparison with East Asian exports to North America. In some 332 instances 
East Asian exports to the European Community appear lower than what might 
have  been expected, given the economic characteristics of  the various East 
Asian economies. In each of these cases actual East Asian exports to the Euro- 
pean Community are below the lower limit of the tolerance interval. In only a 
comparatively few (forty-eight) cases are actual East Asian exports to Euro- 
pean Community markets above the upper limit of the tolerance interval. De- 
spite very rapid growth in East Asian exports to the European Community over 
the past two decades, still greater exports might have been expected. 
As with East Asian exports to the European Community, there are also a 
comparatively large number of extreme observations on East Asian exports to 
North America. By  marked contrast with the extreme observations on East 
Asian exports to the European Community, the extreme observations on ex- 
ports to North America are disproportionately above the upper limit of  the 
tolerance interval. While 85 percent of the 380 extreme observations of exports 
to the European Community are below the lower limit of the tolerance interval, 
only 19 percent of the 195 extreme observations of exports to North America 
are below the lower limit of the tolerance interval. If  East Asian exports are 
less to the European Community than might be expected on the basis of  global 
relationships, they  appear to be more to North America than might be ex- 
pected. While there is no intraregional trade bias if  East Asia is defined as a 
region, if the region is expanded to include the Pacific Basin, then intraregional 
bias does become apparent. 
Does Japan play a special role in East Asia? Japan’s level of productivity and 
its industrial skills and experience remain well ahead of even the most rapidly 
growing economies elsewhere in East Asia. It’s hardly surprising that Japan is 
exporting sophisticated capital goods to its East Asian trading partners, at the 
same time that it’s importing processed raw materials, components, and manu- 
factures from them. There is at present little evidence of a regional bias in 
Japan’s relations with the rest of East Asia that goes beyond the existing pattern 
of East Asian resource endowments. Out of  464 instances of  bilateral trade 
flows between Japan and the other East Asian economies, only 56 extreme 
observations have been uncovered. These divide neatly into 16 cases of Japan 
overexporting, 16 cases of Japan underexporting, 11 cases of Japan overimport- 
ing, 13 cases of Japan underimporting. 
What is particularly interesting about the regional pattern of Japanese trade Table 3.6  Extreme Observations on East Asian Extraregional Exports 
Hong 
Japan  Korea  Taiwan  Kong  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  Indonesia 
+-  +-+-+-  +-+-  +-+-+- 
~~~~____~~~~ 
United States  9  3  11  4  14  6  8  112 3  6  0  12  3  7  2  4  1 
Canada  11294113120714  0906054 
Germany  08212374144102  4  2  11  4  6  2  3 
Netherlands  16040326271  3180204 
UnitedKingdom  0  3  2  5  0  4  3  7  I  4  0  5250306 
France  0  7  0  8  2  10  111 0  8  2  7  0  13  2  8  3  8 
Italy  113 010  19  013 014 0  5  0  11  0  10  0  6 
Nore: Rows in this table index imports. Columns index exports. Each cell indicates the number of extreme observations; + indicates overexporting and -  underex- 
porting. Maximum number of  extreme observations for any bilateral pair is twenty-nine. Critical value for tolerance interval T(.99, .99,957) = 2.51. 107  Pricing Strategies and Trading Blocs in East Asia 
is not how it differs from the rest of the countries in East Asia but rather how 
it is similar. In common with the rest of  the economies, in East Asia, Japan 
exports less to the European Community and more to the United States than 
might be expected. While the European Community appears to exhibit some 
negative bias against imports from East Asia and overall North America ap- 
pears to exhibit considerable bias in favor, Japanese import behavior, at least 
insofar as the model estimated here is concerned, appears virtually neutral with 
respect to the rest of East Asia. 
3.4  Pricing Strategies in East Asia 
If  there is no special intraregional bias in East Asian trade patterns and if 
the growth in East Asian intraregional trade merely reflects the growing global 
economic importance of East Asia, are regional initiatives superfluous except 
as a tactical exercise to prevent discrimination and exclusion elsewhere? Not 
necessarily. The absence of regional bias does not necessarily mean the ab- 
sence of  regional trade bamers. The estimated parameters of  equation (18’) 
may embody all manner of protective barriers. The absence of intraregional 
bias simply means there is no special discrimination in favor of or against East 
Asian trading partners (Saxonhouse 1983). This is quite a different matter from 
concluding, for example, that commodity arbitrage across East Asia is near 
perfect. How integrated are East Asian markets? One helpful way to examine 
this issue might be to look at East Asian firms’ pricing behavior across differ- 
ent East Asian markets. If  East Asian economies are not closely integrated 
with one another, East Asian firms may have greater latitude to employ widely 
different pricing strategies in different markets. 
3.4.1  Lags in External Adjustment 
The slow pace of adjustment to exchange rate realignment in the mid- and 
late 1980s resembled the reaction of trade flows to exchange rate realignments 
of the early and late 1970s. In both cases special emphasis has been placed on 
contractual obligations and habit persistence in  explaining both the slow re- 
sponse of prices to exchange rate changes and the slow response of trade flows 
to the relative price changes that  do take place  (Magee 1973; Wilson and 
Takacs 1980). In something of a departure from earlier analyses of the impact 
of exchange rate change on trade flows, in recent years considerable emphasis 
has been placed on the role of market structure in shaping this process. This 
new  approach suggests  that,  in  any  given  sector,  whether exchange  rate 
changes lead to large relative price changes or negligible price changes will 
depend on industrial structure considerations such as the degree of market con- 
centration, the extent of product homogeneity and substitutability, and the rela- 
tive market shares of domestic and foreign firms (Krugman 1986; Dombusch 
1987). Even absent long-term contracts and habitual behavior, strategic behav- 
ior will indicate widely varying price responses across industries to exchange 108  Gary R. Saxonhouse 
rate changes. Less than full pass-through will be an equilibrium response for 
many industries. 
3.4.2 
In  pursuing  questions  about  the  Pacific  adjustment  process,  work  that 
stresses the role of market structure in understanding global pricing  will be 
helpful. Whereas most of  this  literature emphasizes the distinction between 
pricing decisions in the home market on the one hand and all overseas markets 
collectively on the other, the empirical research presented here will make some 
effort to allow for differences in pricing strategies employed across overseas 
markets.17  Bear in mind that different pricing strategies across markets are only 
possible where barriers to arbitrage exist. 
The International Price Discrimination ModelI4 
Pricing Strategies and the Pacific Adjustment Process 
Assume that commodity arbitrage across markets is ineffective such that 
(19)  Pi  # r,P;’, 
where Pi =  price of good j in home market k in home currency; P;’ =  price of 
good j in foreign market i in foreign currency; and r, =  exchange rate between 
home currency and foreign market i currency. 
In general, the differences in prices across markets will be determined by 
the differences in demand conditions across markets and their relationship to 
the producer’s common marginal cost. As is well known, the gap between price 
in each of the markets (expressed in domestic currency) and the marginal cost 
will be given by 
where 0:  = price elasticity of demand for good j in the home market k, and 
DI  , G price elasticity of demand for good j in the foreign market i. 
Full pass-through. If the demand functions in domestic and overseas markets 
have constant price elasticities, relative prices for good j across markets will 
be invariant. This means exchange rate changes will have no impact on relative 
prices. With constant price elasticity of demand curves, exchange rate changes 
will always be fully passed through to foreign markets. 
Less than full pass-through. Less  than  full  pass-through  of  exchange  rate 
changes will occur when demand curves are less convex than the constant elas- 
ticity of demand curve. In such cases the elasticity of demand will vary directly 
13. Recent papers  that  disaggregate among overseas markets include Froot and Klernperer 
14. See Krugman 1986; Dornbusch 1987; Marston 1990; Feenstra 1989. 
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with price changes. In particular, a fall in price will lower price elasticity and 
a rise in price will raise it. From equation (20) it is seen that in this instance a 
fall (rise) in price will raise (lower) the gap between price and marginal cost. 
Under these demand conditions when the yen appreciates, the price of the 
good in foreign markets rises and the gap between foreign prices and marginal 
cost must narrow. If marginal costs are constant, the gap between price and 
marginal cost will remain the same in the domestic market. This is an obvious 
case of less than complete pass-through. 
In this case pass-through will vary across markets inversely with the convex- 
ity of the demand functions in price. Alternatively, the more elasticity of de- 
mands varies directly with price, the less pass-through will be observed. 
Greater than&ll pass-through. By contrast with the case just described, when 
demand functions are more convex than the constant elasticity of price case, 
exchange  rate changes will lead to greater than full pass-through  (Marston 
1990; Knetter 1992). In this case a price increase will make demand less elas- 
tic. For example, a yen appreciation by raising the foreign price of a good will 
increase the gap abroad between  price and marginal cost. Once again with 
constant marginal costs, the gap between price and costs at home will remain 
the same. With yen appreciation, prices in terms of yen for goods abroad will 
rise relative to the yen price of the same goods at home. In this simple case 
yen appreciation may lead to a rush to concede markets abroad in the interest 
of profits. 
Cost factors. Just as differences in the shape of demand functions are critical 
for explaining differences in the reactions of  foreign markets to exchange rate 
changes, in this price discrimination framework they are also critical for ex- 
plaining  the influence  of other factors on the differences between prices at 
home and abroad for the same good. For example, in the constant elasticity of 
demand case, since price is invariant to any kind of change, no change in wages 
or any other cost factor can change price, so relative prices at home and abroad 
will not change. More generally, if the demand functions have variable elastici- 
ties but have the same curvature, a change in cost will change prices, but always 
by the same rate in all markets. 
In light of the above discussion and considering that income in domestic and 
foreign markets can be expected to affect relative prices at home and abroad, 
the following function can be adopted as an explanation of the gap between 
the domestic price of goodj  and its price in foreign markets i: 
where  qk,  =  real exchange rate between economy  k and economy  i,  wJp, = 
real wages in economy k, mklpk  = real raw material prices in economy k, yk = 
real income in economy k, and y, =  real income in economy i. 110  Gary R. Saxonhouse 
Note equation (21) assumes firms set prices instantaneously in response to 
changes in the right-hand-side variables. If  prices are preset, however, varia- 
tions in 8,  may simply reflect unanticipated events such as change in the ex- 
change rate, rather than destination specific price strategies. 
To allow for this possibility  and following Marston (1990) and Meese and 
Rogoff (1988), it is assumed that both  r, and qk,  follow random walks. This 
means equation (21), with time subscripted by t, becomes 
where Er-, =  expectation on variable  in period  t from information available 
att-  1. 
Equation (22) indicates that, if  no strategic pricing behavior is being em- 
ployed and the pk = 0, then the impact of exchange rate surprises on 8,, will be 
short-lived. In the absence of further changes after a single period, S,  will re- 
turn to its original level. Equation (22) is estimated to throw light on the role 
of the price mechanism in the Pacific adjustment process. The coefficient on 
the change in nominal exchange rate in equation (22) indicates whether there 
is a lag in price setting. Recall the coefficient on the real exchange rate mea- 
sures the  proportion  of  the  real  exchange rate  change  passed  through  into 
prices. 
Data 
Ideally, equation (22) should be estimated for exports based in each of the 
East Asian economies. Currently, comprehensive data are only available for 
exporters based in Japan. Table 3.7 lists the forty-seven product lines for which 
equation (22) has been estimated. Each of these forty-seven product-line equa- 
tions have been  separately estimated for each of the six markets, including 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
Within the much larger number of capital goods exports, these products have 
been chosen on the basis of  data availability for all countries in the sample. 
Monthly data are used for each of the countries from June 1984 to December 
1989. For each of the product lines, the Bank of Japan's  wholesale price index 
for that product is used as the Japanese domestic price. In place of detailed 
country-specific compatible export price data, unit value indexes have been 
constructed for each product line and each country from the Japan Tariff Asso- 
ciation trade data. Admittedly, making use of bilateral unit value indexes for 
relatively narrow  specific product lines in place of  authentic price data may 
introduce a great deal of  error into this  estimation procedure.  Nonetheless, 
because  it is a relative price equation  and not  an import demand or export 
supply equation that is being estimated, the problems posed by using such data 111  Pricing Strategies and Trading Blocs in East Asia 
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are not insurmountable. After all, this variable appears only on the left-hand 
side of all the equations being estimated here.15 
The one truly non-Japanese source of data in this estimation is the monthly 
production indexes used as the active variable in equation (22). These indexes 
have been gathered from the monthly or yearly statistical bulletins of each of 
the six countries in this sample as well as from Japan. The remaining variables, 
including the Japanese manufacturing wage, Japanese raw material prices, and 
the bilateral exchange rates, are all readily available. Finally, in each instance, 
nominal variables are converted to real variables by deflating with the Japanese 
wholesale price index. 
Estimation 
Two hundred and eighty-two relative price equations have been estimated 
with the data just outlined. Each equation is estimated with seventy-seven ob- 
servations after logarithms of  each variable have  been first differenced and 
distributed lags applied. The general results of this estimation are presented in 
tables 3.8 and 3.9. 
As indicated, interest should focus on the coefficients of the change in the 
nominal exchange rate and the coefficients on the level of  the real exchange 
rate. No less than 201 cases out of a possible total of 282 coefficients on the 
level of the real exchange rate are statistically significant from zero. 
At  the level of  the individual foreign market level, these results confirm 
findings from many studies for aggregated overseas markets. Strategic pricing 
15. Froot and Klemperer (1989) and Knetter (forthcoming) follow a similar path in constructing 
destination-specific export price data. 112  Gary R. Saxonhouse 
Table 3.8  Foreign Price-Domestic  Price Gap Equation: Statistically Significant 
Variables by Country (47 equations estimated for each country) 
Korea  Taiwan  Hong Kong  Singapore  Malaysia  Thailand 
Statistically significant price 
Statistically significant 
strategic price setting due 
to real exchange rate 
selling lag  12  10  12  8  20  15 
change H,,:p,  =0  45  39  32  25  32  33 
Satistically significant 
strategic price setting due 
to changes in other 
variables H,:p,  = 0; 
p=O'p  1  ,4  =O.p  ,5  =0  17  18  10  7  12  8 
R'  = ,000-.333  6  7  4  6  8  9 
R'  = ,334-,666  16  14  14  11  12  13 
R2 = ,6666.991  25  26  29  30  27  25 
Note: The numbers in each cell refer to the number of equations in which a statistically significant 
variable corresponding to the row heading appeared. Forty-seven is the maximum number of equa- 
tions in which a variable can appear as statistically significant. 
is a pervasive phenomenon. Of particular interest here, Japanese exporters ex- 
hibit this behavior in the majority  of  their Pacific markets.  Such behavior is 
most pronounced in the Korean market and is practiced by Japanese machinery 
exporters for the  vast majority  of  the capital goods they  sell in East Asia. 
Among types of machinery exports, machinery components, for whatever rea- 
son, seem less subject to strategic pricing than the complete machine. 
Not all 201 statistically significant coefficients on the real exchange rate are 
positive. In no less than twenty cases here this coefficient is negative, illustrat- 
ing the case where rate changes are more than  passed  through  into foreign 
prices. The distribution of such cases by country is given in table 3.10. These 
cases typically reflect the very small size of some of the overseas markets being 
investigated here and the resulting instability of some of the unit value indexes 
being used as dependent variables. 
While strategic pricing is a pervasive phenomenon among Japanese machin- 
ery exporters to elsewhere in East Asia, tables 3.8 and 3.9 indicate that this is 
almost exclusively a response to exchange rate changes. In only 72 out of a 
possible 1,126 cases is there any indication that the gap between foreign prices 
and domestic prices adjusts in a statistically significant way  as a response to 
changes in domestic costs or to shifts in income in either foreign or  domestic 
markets.16  Given the extreme volatility of the real exchange rate compared with 
these other variables, this result should not be surprising. 
More surprising are the relatively few instances where there are significant 
16. Marston (I 990) and Knetter (forthcoming) have similar findings. 113  Pricing Strategies and Trading Blocs in East Asia 
Table 3.9  Foreign Price-Domestic Price Gap Equation: Statistically Significant 
Variables by Capital Good 
Market 
Statistically 
Significant  Statistically 
Strategic Price  Significant 
Statistically  Setting due to  Strategic Price 
Significant  Real Exchange  Setting due to 
Price Setting  Change  Changes in 
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Table 3.9  (continued) 
Statistically 
Significant  Statistically 
Strategic Price  Significant 
Statistically  Setting due to  Strategic Price 
Significant  Real Exchange  Setting due to 
Price Setting  Change  Changes in 
Market  Lag  HG p, = 0  Other Variables 
Printing machinery  -  6  2 
Centrifugal machinery  - 
Electric generators  -  6  1 









Norest Coefficients here are statistically significant at the .OS level. 
Table 3.10  Cases of More than Full Pass-Through by Country 
Korea  2  Singapore  S 
Taiwan  -  Malaysia  3 
Hong Kong  4  Thailand  6 
lags in the resulting prices after exchange rate changes unaccompanied by stra- 
tegic price behavior. Overall, there are seventy-seven cases where the coeffi- 
cient on the change in the nominal exchange rate variable is statistically sig- 
nificant. In only twenty-eight of these cases, however, are pk = 0 and the lags 
in resetting export prices solely responsible for the change in the gap between 
export prices and home market prices. 
What is particularly interesting here is not just that Japanese firms practice 
strategic price setting in all their East Asian markets for almost all the capital 
goods in this sample. This simply tells us that the Japanese market is not fully 
integrated with the rest of East Asia. What is of special importance here is the 
degree to which strategic price setting by  Japanese firms varies across East 
Asian markets. As seen in table 3.11, in no less than thirty-seven out of forty- 
seven product lines, the hypothesis cannot be accepted that the coefficient on 
the real exchange rate is the same across East Asian markets. Significant barri- 
ers to commodity arbitrage in East Asia appear to exist. Considering the inter- 
est in regional trade and investment initiatives in East Asia, further investiga- 
tion is clearly needed as to why pricing behavior by  exporters of  the same 
machinery should vary  so much across geographical markets. Do Japanese 
firms really have the capacity to effectively segregate proximate markets in the 
absence of host government connivance of some sort? 
The results on the weakness of  commodity arbitrage rest on a very simple 
model  of  international price  discrimination. The  limitation of  this  model 115  Pricing Strategies and Trading Blocs in East Asia 
Table 3.11  Do Japanese Firms Use Different Price Strategies across 
East Asian Markets? 
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Notes:  Following Learner (1978),* = F(6,432) > 5.88 is chosen as the criterion for statistical 
-  -  -  -  significance'  HO  .'  PlKorw = PITawan  PlHoneKong  PISmppxc  PlMalaysia = PI  Thaland 
should not be forgotten (see Knetter 1992). Even apart from issues of specifi- 
cation, further evidence for other product lines and for firms based in other 
East Asian home markets needs to be examined. Despite the extraordinary 
growth in intraregional trade in East Asia, the price evidence presented here 
suggests the continuing importance of official and nonofficial barriers to intra- 
regional trade in East Asia. Are these barriers, however, significantly different 
from barriers to intraregional trade in North America or Western Europe? The 
results of estimating equation (22) for Japanese firm behavior in the U.S. and 
Canadian markets for forty-three capital goods are presented in table 3.12. 
Surprisingly, in less than half the cases in either the U.S. or the Canadian mar- 
ket is the real exchange rate coefficient statistically significant. Despite all the 
complaints about lack of  Japanese pass-through of exchange rate changes in 
the North American market, strategic pricing is far less pervasive there than in 
East Asia. Moreover, as indicated in table 3.12, while there may be as many as 
twenty product lines in the sample examined here where the U.S. and Canadian 
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Table 3.12  Japanese Strategic Price Setting in North America 
Canada  United States  F(  2,152) 
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* = Statistically significant; F(2,152) >  4.797, following significance levels correction suggested 
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only half as many  cases do Japanese firms act as if commodity arbitrage is 
not an easy matter across the U.S.-Canadian border. By comparison with their 
behavior in East Asia, Japanese firms appear to treat the U.S.-Canadian mar- 
kets as very well integrated. This is true even for the period before the Canada- 
U.S. Free Trade Agreement was ratified. 
Despite the absence of  intraregional bias in East Asian trade, evidence on 
the ability of Japanese firms to behave as if  East Asian markets are substan- 
tially segregated from one another and their inability to behave the same way 
in North America does suggest that important barriers to East Asian trade re- 
main. Quite apart from the tactical benefits in global negotiations that an East 
Asian grouping might bring, new  East Asian-wide  liberalization could still 
have substantial trade-creating effects within the region. 
3.5  Finale 
Regional initiatives in Europe and North America have triggered consider- 
able interest and concern in the Pacific Basin. New trade initiatives by ASEAN, 
the Mahathir proposal for an East Asian economic group, the rapidly evolving 
APEC now with its own secretariat reflect, at least in part, a reaction to devel- 
opments elsewhere. This is quite apart from the somewhat more familiar, 
smaller subregional trading zones, proposals for which are once again prolifer- 
ating wherever there is proximity in East Asia. These proposals are not being 
made in the face of long-dormant East Asian economic interaction. Quite the 
contrary. In absolute terms, East Asian regional trade and East Asian cross- 
investment have grown very rapidly. 
In the perspective of these developments, this paper concludes 
1. It is certainly possible that trading blocs being formed elsewhere in the 
world might lower East Asian welfare. This can happen even in the absence of 
any explicit or implicit effort by  these blocs to exploit their market power at 
the expense of East Asia. These trading blocs may have no incentive to expand 
their membership to include East Asian economies except insofar as they fear 
provoking the formation of  an East Asian trading bloc. In the presence of  a 
substantial group of disorganized, nonretaliating outsiders, a trading bloc, even 
without violating GATT Article 24, can achieve outcomes for its members that 
might be superior to global free trade. 
2. The rapid growth in intraregional East Asia reflects not much more than 
the very rapid overall growth in this region relative to the rest of  the world. 
Estimation  of  a  bilateral  model  of  intraindustry  trade  using  a  factor- 
endowment-based version of the gravity model suggests no East Asian bias in 
the trading pattern of the leading economies there. When the Pacific region is 
defined to  include North  America, however,  substantial regional  bias  will 
likely be present. This reflects the positive bias found in East Asian exports to 
North America. By contrast, there is a negative bias in East Asian exports to 
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3. Despite the absence of intraregional bias in East Asian exports, evidence 
on the ability of  Japanese firms to behave as if East Asian markets were sub- 
stantially segregated from one another and their inability to behave the same 
way in North America does suggest that important barriers to East Asian trade 
remain. Despite much recent progress, further regionwide liberalization could 
be of particular benefit. 
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Comment  Robert Gilpin 
The theme of my comments is that institutions are important in understanding 
how  market forces affect international  affairs. As political  scientists at this 
conference have been emphasizing, economists too frequently omit institutions 
just as political scientists too frequently underestimate the role and efficacy of 
markets in human affairs. In my comments, however, I am interested only in 
pointing out the limitations of economic analysis of developments in East Asia. 
The world of the economist is composed primarily of individual firms and 
consumers responding to changes in prices and quantities. Such neoclassical 
methods of analysis are very powerful tools indeed, and needless to say, many 
political  scientists envy the economists their models and equations. But it is 
important to recognize that market signals take place in an institutional setting. 
As economists since Ronald Coase have taught us, institutions can do many 
good and useful things, that is, decrease transactions costs, reduce uncertain- 
ties, and enhance efficiency. But as several political scientists have emphasized 
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over the past few days, institutions also create differential opportunities and 
constraints on economic activities. Institutions do not create opportunities and 
constraints equally for all firms and consumers. By their very nature, institu- 
tions exclude some participants and have powerful distributive effects both do- 
mestically and internationally. In fact, as we all know but too frequently forget, 
institutions are created for purposes of rent seeking and redistribution perhaps 
as frequently as they are created to increase efficiency. 
As economists have taught those of us who might be called “political econo- 
mists,” or as one of my Princeton economist colleagues prefers, “economical 
politicians,” what transforms the world are major price changes, supply shocks, 
and the like. From this perspective the most significant transforming event in 
the recent history of the Pacific economy has been the dramatic appreciation 
of  the yen  (enduku) following the Plaza Accord of  September 1985. Before 
this development, Japan had been interested in Southeast Asia, especially Ma- 
laysia and Thailand, primarily as sources of raw materials. There was relatively 
little Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region and almost none 
in the manufacturing and services sectors. 
The effect of endaka was suddenly to make many Japanese products non- 
competitive in world markets. In response to this development,  Japanese multi- 
national corporations, with the support of  the Japanese government, began to 
invest heavily and to establish subsidiaries in Southeast Asia. In particular, they 
established overseas manufacturing subsidiaries in those low-tech industries in 
which Japan was losing comparative advantage because of  yen  appreciation. 
At the same time, these Japanese firms moved up the technological ladder at 
home to high-tech industries and exports. While these developments were a 
rational response to market forces, it is important to understand that they are an 
outgrowth of Japanese industrial organization and the relations of the Japanese 
corporation to the Japanese state. 
Through the combination of Japanese FDI, intrafirm trade, and the infra- 
structure investments financed by  Japanese official development assistance 
(ODA), the Southeast Asian economies are being linked closely to the Japa- 
nese home economy. In a number of industrial sectors such as automobiles and 
consumer electronics, a regional division of  labor and complementary eco- 
nomic ties under Japanese leadership are being created. Whereas Japan is the 
primary producer of high-tech, high value-added  products and components, 
the subsidiaries of Japanese firms in Southeast Asia are either assembly opera- 
tions or producers of labor-intensive goods that employ lower-cost local labor. 
Products produced by  Japanese subsidiaries in Southeast Asia are for local 
consumption, for export back to Japan itself, or for third markets, especially 
the United States. Peter Petri in his paper gives us a wonderful picture of one 
example of  this evolving regional division of  labor in  what he calls Toyota 
Motor’s regional interdependence structure. In effect, a regional institutional 
structure uniting Japan and the Southeast Asia economies is taking shape that 
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It is quite obvious that developments in East Asia have great economic and 
potential political significance. However, this development is not adequately 
captured by Gary Saxonhouse’s paper. His analysis does not really address the 
changing economic and institutional relationships. I do not and in fact cannot 
challenge his economic analysis of intraregional and extraregional trade flows. 
His careful analysis of the data is certainly reasonable and convincing on its 
own terms. But one wants to know whose trade and what trade are benefiting 
from the increasing economic and institutional ties in the region that are being 
created by Japanese investment and ODA flows. For example, as has been sug- 
gested above, we know that Japanese firms control the production and trade in 
almost all high-tech industries such as automobiles and consumer electronics. 
This fact is a datum point that is as important as Saxonhouse’s gross trade 
figures. Institutional ties really capture the economic and political significance 
of what is happening in the region. 
It is undoubtedly true, as many participants in this conference have empha- 
sized, that Japanese FDI, trade, and ODA are of  great benefit to the region. 
Furthermore, I personally do not fear, at least for the moment, the reestablish- 
ment of a Japanese-led coprosperity sphere in the region. However, the overall 
results of the integration of vital sectors of these regional economies with the 
Japanese home economy does raise issues of  long-term significance. These 
developments appear to be the following: 
1. The increasing importance of  the Japanese model of political economy 
in the economic development strategies of  the economies in the region. This 
model has at least three elements that distinguish it from the American model 
of political economy: the primacy of producer over consumer interests, an in- 
dustrial organization based on industrial groupings, and the crucial role of state 
interventionism in guiding economic development. 
2. The internationalization of Japanese industrial policy, that is, the effort 
of Japanese firms backed by the Japanese state to create in the region a group 
of complementary economies and a regional division of labor. 
3.  The creation of a Japanese-led system of international production, espe- 
cially in high-tech sectors, closely integrated with the Japanese home econ- 
omy. As some commentators have  suggested, it is unnecessary for Japan to 
create a formal regional bloc because Japanese corporations in the region are 
creating a de facto regional bloc. 
Whether the long-term result of these developments will be an East Asian 
trading region within a larger multilateral global economy, an exclusive East 
Asian trading bloc, or a revival of the 1930s coprosperity sphere has yet to be 
determined. A great deal will obviously depend on what happens in North 
America and especially in Western Europe. Will these regional economies re- 
main open or will they become closed systems? Japan and the other East Asian 
economies are highly dependent on world markets and are hardly likely to 
initiate moves that would encourage an intensification of regional trading ar- 122  Gary R.  Saxonhouse 
rangements.  Meanwhile,  several  questions  need  to  be  posed.  The  first  is 
whether nations with fundamentally different economic institutions will want 
to play by basically different rules. For example, the United States and Japan 
have very different concepts of antitrust and collusive behavior. Are Japanese 
firms  establishing  such an overwhelming  presence  in  the  region  that  non- 
Japanese firms will be effectively  excluded? A lot of  evidence suggests that 
this development is already occurring. Will the United States continue to pro- 
vide a security umbrella over a region in which its economic interests are de- 
clining? Again, there  is much evidence to suggest that such a pullback has 
already begun. These questions are but a few that suggest that political analy- 
sis, however intuitive it may sometimes be, is a necessary complement to the 
more rigorous methods of the economist. 
I said earlier that economists are very sensitive to price changes and are alert 
to their effects. By the same token, political scientists tend to be very sensitive 
to changes in power relations and their effects. When one observes major shifts 
in the global or regional distribution of economic and hence political power, 
there will inevitably be profound security and diplomatic effects. For this rea- 
son, it is important to ask what these political and security consequences could 
be rather than to imply that nothing of  political  significance is occurring. In 
East and Southeast Asia, we must be alert to the significant shift in the distribu- 
tion of economic power that is taking place and that in time will profoundly 
affect the security relations in the regions. 
Comment  Lawrence B. Krause 
The excellent  papers by  Peter Petri, Jeffrey Frankel,  and Gary  Saxonhouse 
make a similar point in different ways, namely, that trade and other economic 
relations in the Pacific Basin do not reflect a line down the Pacific that sepa- 
rates the western Pacific from North America. Instead economic forces seem 
to be integrating the two sides of the Pacific into a single region. 
Nevertheless,  because  of  there being three very  large industrial countries 
with currencies to match (German D-mark, Japanese yen, and U.S. dollar), it 
is commonplace for reference to be made to triad power, or even more point- 
edly to a three-bloc world. This literary shorthand would not be of much con- 
cern except that, if three blocs were to become a reality, it could mean a disaster 
for the world economy. There is little doubt that Europe is a distinct region, 
and that Germany is its most powerful member. However, the question remains 
as to whether Japan and the United States are in economically distinct regions, 
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or  whether they are part of the same economic entity. The three papers give 
support to the latter conception. 
What would be so bad about a three-bloc world? Analysis of a three-bloc 
configuration with Germany, the United States, and Japan being the regional 
hegemonies suggest that they would be internally contentious and externally 
aggressive.  Game theory suggests that such a trading system would be very 
unstable in that there would be frequent changes in alliances, regions would 
follow aggressive tit-for-tat  strategies, and  short-term considerations  would 
overwhelm  long-term  interests.  The most  serious  problems  would  arise  if 
Japan and the United States were to be in different and rival regions, for these 
two countries represent the most extreme examples of economic integration 
among nonneighboring countries anywhere in the world. It is unlikely that the 
global system as it exists today could be sustained in such an atmosphere. 
What gives the three-bloc concept some saliency is the formalization of the 
already existing close economic integration of North America into NAFTA, 
and the ill-considered  trade  elements  in  President Bush’s Enterprise of  the 
Americas Initiative  (EAI), which could extend  NAFTA to the whole of the 
Western Hemisphere. While analysis can clearly show that even an expanded 
NAFTA cannot replace global economic linkages for the United States, fear 
has been created that the United States may be turning inward within the con- 
fines of a protected  subregion. This has led to suggestions for an East Asian 
economic group or caucus. 
How can the breakup of  the world economy into three rival trading regions 
be prevented? Would it not be better to have just a multilateral system without 
any regions at all? In the abstract, it might have been better if the European 
Community had not been a political necessity, but it was, and no one should 
believe that breaking up the EC today would be beneficial for any country. It 
should also be noted that NAFTA is desirable on its own terms and should not 
disadvantage nonmember countries.  Canada, Mexico, and the United States 
are special cases of neighbors well along in the process of integration. In real- 
ity, capital markets and labor markets are already integrated. Only the goods 
and service markets were separated, which NAFTA is designed to correct. 
Could NAFTA turn inward  and cause the problems that others fear? It is 
probably less likely that the North American countries would collectively turn 
inward than they would individually. NAFTA is simply too small to serve the 
needs of the United States. The United States requires access to global markets 
and particularly the growing markets of the Pacific Basin. The United States 
could not confine its economic activity to North America without severe eco- 
nomic hardship. 
If a rival East Asian bloc were to be created in the absence of any real need, 
it would raise concerns elsewhere as to what its real intentions were. Hence 
the onus of undermining the world economy would fall on East Asia, not on 
the EC or NAFTA (although NAFTA should not be enlarged). 
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turn to regional initiatives. The time will be ripe for solidifying an institutional 
structure that reflects the economic reality analyzed in the three papers. This 
can be done by  building an APEC, which includes the United States, Japan, 
and the other outwardly oriented countries of the Pacific. With a strong APEC, 
the world trade  regime would be headed toward a benign two-region  world 
rather than a three-bloc configuration. 